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This paper studies how the likelihood and timing of divorce is influenced 
by Social Security’s ten-year rule, which provides spousal benefits to divorced 
people if their marriages lasted at least ten years. Bunching analysis indicates 
that approximately 2 percent of divorces occurring in the six months after 
ten-year anniversaries would have occurred earlier if not for Social Security’s 
ten-year rule. For older couples, who are likely more focused on retirement and 
have greater earnings disparities, divorces are approximately 9 percent higher 
in the two years after ten-year anniversaries than would be predicted without 
the abrupt change in Social Security benefits. The increase in divorces after ten 
years of marriage appears to come from couples with disparate earning records. 
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1 Introduction 
When and why people divorce matters because divorce has both emotional and 
economic implications.1 Divorcing couples are happier after the divorce than before 
it, which means that delaying divorce can have psychic costs (Gardner and Oswald 
2006). An individual’s potential financial well-being after divorce is likely a factor in 
the decision to leave a marriage, but understanding how financial well-being outside 
of marriage affects divorce is complicated by a couple’s financial situation being re-
lated to many unobserved factors that also affect divorce probabilities. This paper 
examines how Social Security’s ten-year rule, which entitles divorced individuals to 
Social Security spousal benefits if their marriages lasted at least ten years, affects di-
vorce timing and likelihood. This arbitrary rule creates a sharp increase in the value 
of exiting a marriage at ten-year anniversaries for secondary earners relative to the 
value of exiting the marriage at nine years and provides an opportunity to understand 
how financial factors affect divorce. 
In economic models of marriage, people choose to be married when the value of 
being married exceeds the value of being single. Therefore, raising the value of being 
single for married people should theoretically increase divorces, and people who would 
benefit from Social Security’s ten-year rule should have an incentive to delay divorce 
until after ten years of marriage. Despite a theoretical basis for Social Security’s ten-
year rule affecting divorce, Dickert-Conlin and Meghea (2004) find its implementation 
in 1977 had little immediate impact on divorce timing using a difference-in-differences 
strategy with the length of marriage in years from Vital Statistics data. Goda et al. 
(2007) point out that the ten-year rule should have a larger influence on couples with 
1Much research studies the consequences of divorce on economic outcomes. For examples, refer 
to Ananat and Michaels (2008), Bedard and Deschenes (2005), Couch et al. (2013), Gadalla (2008), 
Genadek et al. (2007), Lavelle and Smock (2012), Page and Stevens (2004), Peters et al. (2014), and 
Smock et al. (1999). 
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disparate earnings histories. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID), they find small, statistically insignificant effects of the ten-year rule on 
vulnerable couples. 
Other research on the link between financial incentives and divorce has found 
mixed results. Alm and Whittington (1997) use PSID data to study how income tax 
penalties affect marriage and divorce decisions. They find evidence that marriage de-
cisions respond to tax penalties while divorce decisions do not. Bitler et al. (2004), on 
the other hand, find divorce propensities fall after the passage of welfare reforms that 
increase the value of being married relative to being single. Thus, the current state 
of the literature is inconclusive about whether or not financial incentives influence 
divorce. 
The current paper studies how the ten-year rule affects divorce using 1985 to 1995 
Vital Statistics divorce data with the length of marriage in months. If Social Secu-
rity’s ten-year rule affects divorce through either a decrease in divorces before the 
ten-year mark or an increase after it, divorces should discontinuously increase imme-
diately after ten-year anniversaries. Plotting divorces by the duration of marriage in 
months and estimating the discontinuity in the divorce rate at ten years of marriage 
show clear evidence of a distortion in the distribution of divorces around ten-year 
anniversaries. I then implement bunching analysis to quantify how many divorces are 
delayed and for how long. The basic approach involves using how divorces trend with 
marriage duration away from ten-year anniversaries to estimate how they would trend 
near them if not for the benefit change occurring immediately at the tenth year of 
marriages. With the counterfactual distribution estimated, I then calculate the di-
vorces missing from the distribution before ten-year anniversaries as well as the extra 
ones after them. 
The bunching analysis indicates that about 2 percent of divorces occurring in 
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the six months after ten-year anniversaries would have occurred before them if not 
for Social Security’s ten-year rule. Responses to the ten-year rule vary dramatically 
by age. For couples with the woman under the age of 25 at the time of marriage, I 
find only weak evidence of a small effect of the ten-year rule on divorce rates. For 
couples where the woman was 45 or older at the time of marriage, I find that there 
are 9 percent more divorces in the two years after ten-year anniversaries than the 
estimated distribution predicts. 
Since the Vital Statistics collection program ended in 1995 and because having 
individual-level economic data is necessary to examine characteristics of couples who 
divorce, I also draw on data from the 2008 to 2011 American Community Survey 
(ACS). People delaying divorce until their tenth anniversaries would cause the like-
lihood of being divorced to increase discontinuously after ten years of marriage. For 
people who married at older ages, the likelihood of being divorced gaps up at ten-
year anniversaries by 19.4 percent. The marriages that end are those where one spouse 
worked in an occupation that earned at least 50 percent more than the other spouse’s 
occupation and those with spouses with unequal education levels. Thus, it appears 
that Social Security’s ten-year rule affects couples where one member has a higher 
earnings potential than the other. 
These results provide strong evidence that Social Security and financial consider-
ations factor into divorce decisions, especially for older Americans. The current paper 
extends previous work on Social Security’s ten-year rule in several ways. First, the 
paper focuses on data several years after the implementation of the ten-year rule, 
meaning people would be more likely to know about the ten-year rule and how to 
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take advantage of it.2 Second, the paper uses Vital Statistics data with the length 
of marriages in months. When examining a flow measure like divorce rates, know-
ing the length of marriage in months is crucial as it allows for examining divorces 
within a close range of ten-year anniversaries. Similarly, having the duration of mar-
riages in months allows for examining whether or not divorces bunch around ten-year 
anniversaries. Finally, the large data sets used in the analysis allow for exploring 
heterogeneous effects of the ten-year rule based on age at the time of marriage. Un-
derstanding heterogeneity by age is important as changes in family structure in old 
age have become increasingly common. Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) document the 
recent rise in marital formation of older Americans, while Brown and Lin (2012) 
study the dramatic increase in divorces for older Americans, which they term the 
“gray divorce revolution.” 
2 Background 
2.1 Social-Security’s Ten-Year Rule 
People contribute to Social Security through payroll taxes, and employers match 
the employee contribution. Upon retiring, workers can receive Social Security benefits 
if they accumulated at least forty quarters of earnings over their work lives. The size 
of the benefit, or the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), is computed based on the 
average of the worker’s highest 35 years of indexed monthly earnings.3 
2Studying the implementation of the ten-year rule has added empirical challenges because the 
ten-year rule applied to divorces retroactively, meaning people could have delayed divorce before the 
law became effective if they anticipated the law. Alternatively, if people who would have delayed 
divorce until the ten-year mark had already divorced when the law was passed, it could take several 
years before the ten-year rule would display an effect. 
3People receive their full PIA if they retire at the full retirement age. Beginning in 2000, the full 
retirement age began to rise incrementally from age 65 to age 67. People can retire starting at age 
62 and receive a reduced benefit (Social Security Administration 2013). 
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If their ex-spouses are still alive, former spouses are eligible for spousal benefits 
of 50 percent of the primary earners’ PIA if their marriages lasted at least ten years 
before ending in divorce. If their ex-spouses are deceased, former spouses are eligible 
for spousal benefits equal to the primary earners’ full PIA if their marriages lasted 
at least ten years before ending in divorce.4 Even former spouses who qualify for 
Social Security on their own earnings histories can still receive spousal benefits if the 
spousal benefits are greater than what they would receive based on their own earnings. 
Divorced people whose marriages lasted fewer than ten years are not eligible for any 
spousal benefits. 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) defines eligibility based on formal mar-
riage length. A separation delayed until ten years of marriage would still be considered 
intact. Remarrying results in the individual no longer being eligible for spousal bene-
fits from a previous marriage; however, if a subsequent marriage ends in divorce, the 
person can be eligible for spousal benefits from any previous marriages that lasted 
at least ten years. An ex-spouse remarrying does not affect an individual’s eligibility 
(Social Security Administration 2013).5 
The ten-year rule was part of a 1977 Social Security law and went into effect in 
1979. While the main purpose of the 1977 law was to ensure the financial stability 
of Social Security, it also changed the length of marriage requirement for spousal 
benefits from twenty years to ten years because marriages were ending more quickly 
than before (Dickert-Conlin and Meghea 2004). 
The vast majority of spousal benefits go to women since they tend to have lower 
4Spousal benefits are different than survivor benefits. A widow or widower is also entitled to the 
deceased spouse’s full PIA as long as the marriage lasted at least nine months before the death of 
the spouse. 
5A divorced spouse receiving a spousal benefit does not affect the other spouse’s Social Security 
payment in any way. If a person has several marriages that last ten years, all former spouses can 
claim spousal benefits under his PIA without affecting his benefit. Married people can receive spousal 
benefits after one year of marriage. 
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PIAs. In 2006, approximately 8 percent of people receiving Social Security received it 
through the spousal benefit, and approximately 98 percent of people receiving spousal 
benefits were women. The ex-husband’s full PIA is much more likely to be larger than 
the woman’s PIA than half of the ex-husband’s PIA is. For this reason, a majority 
of divorced wives will receive benefits based on their deceased ex-husbands’ PIA if 
their ex-husbands die (Butrica and Smith 2012). As more women enter the labor force 
and earn higher wages, more women are receiving Social Security without the spousal 
benefit (Social Security Administration 2013 and Goda et al. 2007). 
2.2 Conceptual Framework - Heterogeneity by Age at Time 
of Marriage 
The impact of the ten-year rule likely varies with age. As retirement is nearer for 
older people, they are likely more focused on Social Security benefits. Young people, 
on the other hand, tend to be myopic in thinking about retirement. Young people 
also likely do not know the value of the spousal benefit as earnings typically peak 
later in life, whereas older people generally have a better idea about whether or not 
spousal benefits would increase their Social Security payments.6 
Even if young people are perfectly rational and forward thinking, they still may 
not be influenced by Social Security’s ten-year rule because they have time to marry 
again and to achieve spousal benefits through another spouse. Since married people 
are no longer eligible for spousal benefits from previous marriages, young people would 
have to go through most of their adult lives unmarried or have subsequent marriages 
end in divorce to claim spousal benefits from divorces that occurred in their twenties 
6For both older and younger people, Social Security benefits can be difficult to calculate, and 
people often have a difficult time estimating their benefits. To give people a better idea of their 
benefits, the SSA began mailing out annual statements of benefits in 1995. 
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or early thirties. Approximately 69 percent of women and 78 percent of men remarry 
after divorce (Schoen and Standish 2001), and young divorced people are much more 
likely to remarry than older divorced people (Brown et al. 2006), suggesting young 
divorced people likely expect to remarry. Not remarrying is a smaller price to pay 
for older adults. Older couples are also more likely to respond to the ten-year rule 
because a higher percentage of couples from older cohorts have disparate earnings 
records. Younger generations of women have more parity with their husbands and 
would be less likely to benefit from the ten-year rule. 
Throughout the remainder of the paper, I consider how the ten-year rule influences 
divorce for the full sample as well as for three broad age groups. For the couple-level 
Vital Statistics data, the groups are couples with women younger than 25 at marriage, 
couples with women 25 to 44 at marriage, and couples with women 45 or older at 
marriage. With the individual-level ACS data, the groups are women younger than 
25 at the start of marriage, women ages 25 to 44 at the start of marriage, and women 
45 or older at the start of marriage. I focus on the age of the woman since women 
are more likely to receive spousal benefits. To ensure that these broad age groups 
are appropriate, I also consider smaller age bins, which produce noisier results but 
provide a fuller picture of how the response to the ten-year rule varies by age. 
3 Bunching in Divorces around Ten-Year Anniver-
saries 
3.1 Data 
The first set of results uses Vital Statistics data from 1985 to 1995. The Vital 
Statistics data were compiled by the National Center for Health Statistics and contain 
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information from divorce certificates collected at the state level. About half of all 
states participated in the program. While some states provided a random sample to 
the National Center for Health Statistics, other states provided data on all divorce 
certificates. These data are not nationally representative as the non-reporting states 
come disproportionately from the South and Mountain West.7 I restrict the sample 
to couples who divorced within four years of their ten-year anniversaries. 
The Vital Statistics data have several advantages. First, they contain information 
on the month and year of marriage and divorce, meaning I can calculate the duration 
of marriage in months. Second, the data set is large. For the years 1985 to 1995, the 
data contain information on 2,008,923 divorces. Of these, 1,818,591 contain the ages 
of the spouses and the information necessary to compute the duration of marriage in 
months. Finally, these data come straight from divorce certificates and are likely very 
accurate. 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
Discontinuity at Ten Years since Marriage 
If Social Security’s ten-year rule leads to couples delaying divorce until their ten-
year anniversaries, then the divorce rate would discontinuously increase at ten years 
since marriages began. Thus, as a simple test of whether or not the ten-year rule 
influences divorce rates, I begin by examining whether or not a discontinuity exists 
at ten years since marriage by estimating the following equation: 
ym = α + f(m, λ) + Dmβ + ηm, (1) 
7Refer to Shryock and Siegel (1973) for more information about Vital Statistics divorce data and 
to Kennedy and Ruggles (2014) for more information about the history of the collection of divorce 
data in the United States more generally. 
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where m indexes marriage duration in months, y is the number of divorces happen-
ing at a given duration, f is a smooth function representing the duration profile of 
divorces, D is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the divorce occurs after at least ten 
years of marriage, and η is an unobserved error component. I estimate Equation (1) 
by modeling f as a quadratic polynomial on either side of the ten-year threshold. In 
addition to estimating Equation (1) with the number of divorces as the dependent 
variable, I also include the log of the number of marriages at a given duration as the 
dependent variable, which will allow the β coefficients to be interpreted as estimates 
of the percentage discontinuities in divorce rates. 
Bunching 
Testing for a discontinuity at ten years of marriage allows for establishing whether 
or not Social-Security’s ten-year rule affects divorce rates, but it does not allow for 
examining whether or not the increase in divorces at ten-year anniversaries are retimed 
or to examine the length of any retiming. Thus, I also employ bunching analysis. 
To examine bunching in divorces around the ten-year marks of marriages, I exclude 
data from around the ten-year cutoff and estimate how divorces would trend with 
months since marriage in the absence of the abrupt change in incentives at ten-
year anniversaries. I then use this counterfactual distribution to examine bunching 
behavior around ten-year anniversaries. Persson (2014) uses a similar strategy to 
study marriage timing in response to changing survivor’s insurance in Sweden.8 
8Bunching analysis has also been used to study responses to tax thresholds by Bastani and 
Selin (2014), Kleven and Waseem (2014), Kopczuk and Munroe (2014), and Saez (2010). Manoli 
and Weber (2014) use bunching analysis to study how employer-provided retirement benefits affect 
retirement timing. 
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To implement this approach, I first estimate the following equation: 
ym = α + g(m, λ) + ηm, (2) 
where m indexes the duration of marriage in months, y is the number of divorces 
happening at a given duration, g is a polynomial in the marriage duration, and η is an 
unobserved error component. I estimate Equation (2) excluding divorces around ten-
year anniversaries. I then use the parameter estimates to compute ŷbefore and ŷafter, 
estimates of the number of divorces that would have occurred in the omitted bunching 
region without a change in divorce incentives occurring at the ten-year marks of 
marriages. I next calculate the bunching estimates B̂ before and B̂ after as the difference 
between the number of divorces predicted from the counterfactual distribution and the 
ˆactual number of divorces occurring in the bunching regions, where Bbefore estimates 
ˆthe missing mass of divorces for couples before ten-year anniversaries and Bafter 
estimates the bunching that occurs immediately after ten-year anniversaries. 
This framework requires two main assumptions. The first is that g would trend 
smoothly if not for Social Security’s ten-year rule. A possible concern with this as-
sumption is that there may have always existed something related to ten years of 
marriage that causes marriages to end that is completely unrelated to Social Secu-
rity’s ten-year rule, which could be the case since many factors enter into divorce 
decisions that cannot be observed in administrative data. For example, a gap in di-
vorces at ten-year anniversaries would exist if couples wanted to hold out until the 
ten-year milestone before divorcing for psychological reasons or if there was another 
unobserved change happening at ten years of marriage. As a test of the assumption 
that g would trend smoothly if not for the ten-year rule, I replicate the Vital Statistics 
analysis using data from before the ten-year rule’s implementation in Appendix A. 
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I find no evidence of any trend break at ten years of marriage before the ten-year 
rule was implemented, which suggests that Social Security’s ten-year rule is indeed 
responsible for the altered divorce distribution.9 
The second assumption is that data from outside the bunching region can be used 
to approximate g within the bunching region. This assumption would be violated 
if people delayed divorce from very early on in marriages to benefit from the ten-
year rule. This assumption relates to the choice of bunching regions, which is not 
immediately clear. The bunching region needs to be wide enough to exclude divorces 
affected by the ten-year rule; however, making the bunching region too wide can 
result in the loss of precision and results in Equation (2) being used to estimate ŷ’s 
far out of sample. Therefore, I report results for a range of bunching regions. I begin 
by setting the bunching region to be six months before and six months after ten-year 
anniversaries. This bunching region allows for a focused examination within a close 
range of ten-year anniversaries but assumes that couples do not delay divorce for 
more than six months and that divorces delayed because of the ten-year rule happen 
quickly after ten-year anniversaries. To consider the possibility of longer delays and 
to allow couples more time to divorce after reaching their ten-year anniversaries, I 
also show results that set the bunching regions to be one, one-and-a-half, and two 
years before and two years after ten-year anniversaries. For the main analysis, g is 
fitted as a cubic polynomial. In Appendix B, I consider the sensitivity of the results 
to specifying g as different polynomials. 
Standard errors for the bunching estimates are estimated by bootstrapping. To do 
this, I draw a random sample with replacement from the original sample that is equal 
in size to the original sample. I then replicate the procedure described above 1,000 
9In results available upon request, I also test for discontinuities in divorce rates at five, fifteen, 
and twenty years of marriage and find none, which provides more evidence that people do not delay 
divorce to reach certain milestones. 
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ˆ ˆtimes to produce a distribution of Bbefore and Bafter. The standard errors for the 
bunching estimates are then calculated as the standard deviation of the distribution 
of bootstrapped estimates. 
3.3 Results 
Figure 1 shows the number of divorces by marriage length for all ages and for 
different age groups. For older couples in particular, divorces gap up immediately 
after ten-year anniversaries. For couples in the middle age group, divorces also appear 
to increase slightly at ten-year anniversaries. For couples where the woman was 25 or 
younger at the time of marriage, divorces appear to trend more smoothly. 
The β coefficients from Equation (1) are shown in Table 1 and reveal a statistically 
significant increase in the divorce rate for people 25 and older at the time of marriage 
as well as for the full sample. For couples where the woman was at least 45 or older at 
marriage, divorces increase by 23 percent at ten-year anniversaries. For middle-aged 
couples, divorces increase by over 4 percent immediately after ten-year anniversaries. 
For younger couples, there is only weak evidence of an increase in divorces after 
ten-year anniversaries. For the full sample, divorces increase by 3.3 percent.10 
These results provide evidence that age is a major factor in how divorce decisions 
respond to the ten-year rule. To further explore how the response to the ten-year rule 
varies with age, I replicate the analysis using five-year age bins in Table 2. With one 
exception, the point estimates rise with each age bin, though they are generally not 
statistically significantly different from each other. These results reveal a nonlinear 
10In Appendix C, I test for evidence of bunching in divorces at twenty years of marriage using 
data from 1966 to 1974, which is when Social Security required twenty years of marriage before 
ex-spouses would be eligible for spousal benefits. I do not find strong evidence that people were 
delaying divorces to reach twenty-year anniversaries. This null result suggests that people who have 
been married for longer may be less responsive to Social Security’s rules regarding divorce or that 
the switch to the ten-year rule raised awareness of Social Security’s divorce rules. 
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response to the ten-year rule. For women in the three older age bins, the estimated 
discontinuities are statistically significant and large. For women who married at 56 
to 60, the estimated increase in divorces in over 60 percent.11 
I next implement the bunching procedure described in Section 3.2 to produce 
estimates of the missing mass of divorces during the six months before ten-year an-
niversaries and the bunching that takes place during the six months after ten-year 
anniversaries. The results are shown in the top panel of Table 3 and suggest that 
approximately 2 percent of divorces occurring in the six months after ten-year an-
niversaries are delayed from the six months before. For couples with women who were 
45 or older at marriage, approximately 11.8 percent of divorces occurring during the 
six months after ten-year anniversaries appear to be retimed. For couples with women 
who married younger, 1.8 percent of divorces occurring in the six months after divorce 
are retimed. 
In panels B and C, I set the bunching regions to be one year and one-and-a-half 
years, respectively. The results from both bunching regions suggest that there are ex-
tra divorces after ten-year anniversaries for couples with women who were 45 or older 
at marriage. For couples with women who married younger, the results from panels 
B and C are contradictory. In panel B, the results imply that there is a missing mass 
of divorces immediately prior to ten-year anniversaries for couples with women who 
were younger than 45 at marriage. In panel C, the results imply that there are extra 
divorces after ten year-anniversaries for couples with women who were younger than 
45 at marriage. The results from the bunching analysis for younger women being sen-
sitive to the bunching window likely suggests that g does a poor job predicting what 
would happen within the bunching region using data far from the cutoff for younger 
11I do not consider higher age bins because there are not couples divorcing at each marriage 
duration in months for older ages. 
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women. Thus, the results for the larger bunching windows should be interpreted with 
caution for younger couples. 
Panel D displays results with the bunching region set to be two years before and 
after ten-year anniversaries. With this wide bunching region, there is only evidence 
of bunching for couples where the woman was 45 or older at the time of marriage. 
There are approximately 9.1 percent more divorces occurring during years 10 and 
11 than the estimated distribution predicts. The estimate of divorces missing during 
years 8 and 9 is statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the extra 
divorces may not be merely retimed from years 8 and 9. These results for older couples 
are consistent with the results from the one-year and one-and-a-half-year bunching 
windows. 
The results from the wider bunching regions suggest that older people may not 
have divorced if they would never have received spousal benefits or that they delay 
divorce from very early on in marriages for spousal benefits. These results make 
interpreting the results with the bunching region set to be six months before and 
after difficult to interpret for older individuals. It appears that the ten-year rule 
affects divorce rates for older couples into the eleventh year after marriage, meaning 
estimates of ŷbefore and ŷafter might be biased downward when the bunching region 
is set to six months. 
The results presented in this section are most comparable to Dickert-Conlin and 
Meghea (2004), who find no immediate impact of the ten-year rule’s implementation 
using Vital Statistics data from 1975 to 1980.12 These differences suggest that while 
people may not have changed their behavior because of Social Security’s ten-year rule 
12Dickert-Conlin and Meghea (2004) use a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the imme-
diate effect of the law by comparing divorces in 1978-1980 to divorces in 1975-1977. When I compare 
the discontinuities from Equation (1) from these two time periods, I find no significant differences, 
which corroborates the Dickert-Conlin and Meghea result of no immediate impact of the law and 
suggests that differences in methods are not the reason I find the ten-year rule influences divorce. 
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immediately, older people in particular soon began adjusting their divorce timing so 
that they could receive spousal benefits after divorce. 
4 Changes in the Likelihood of Being Married 
4.1 Data 
While the Vital Statistics data are ideal for examining how the ten-year rule in-
fluences the distribution and timing of divorces, the Vital Statistics data lack many 
demographic and labor force variables, meaning they do not allow for knowing charac-
teristics of couples the ten-year rule influences. Examining characteristics of couples 
is important because economic theory suggests that couples with large disparities 
between the primary and secondary earners should be the most responsive to the 
ten-year rule. The Vital Statistics records are also strictly a flow measure, whereas 
we are also interested in if and how the stock of marriages changes at the ten-year 
mark. Because of these issues and to focus on more recent data, I examine Social Se-
curity’s ten-year rule using Integrated Public Use Microsample Series (IPUMS) ACS 
data from 2008 to 2011. 
Beginning in 2008, the ACS began asking people the year their most recent mar-
riage began. I subtract people’s answers to this question from the survey year to 
calculate the years since their marriages began. I focus on people over the age of 17 
who married 5 to 14 years prior. Because I am interested in how the likelihood of 
being divorced changes, only non-widowed ever married people are included in the 
sample. With the ACS, the unit of observation is the individual because I can only 
identify both members of the couple when the couple is still married. Because women 
make up the vast majority of people receiving spousal benefits and to keep the results 
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concise, I focus on women with the ACS analysis.13 Since the SSA considers couples 
who have separated as having intact marriages, I code separated people as still being 
married. As with the Vital Statistics, the ACS also has the advantage of being large. 
The final sample contains 809,912 observations. This large sample size contrasts with 
the PSID, which also has information on marriage histories. The PSID only has data 
on 16,361 marriages, the vast majority of which are comprised of young people. 
Despite its advantages, the ACS has three issues. The first is that we only know the 
length of marriage in years, which means that brief delays in divorce are difficult to 
observe. Unless divorces are delayed for considerable lengths of time or there is a spike 
in divorce rates after ten years that is not from retimed marriages, we may not find 
any evidence the ten-year rule affects the likelihood of divorcing even if it does. For 
this reason, the ACS analysis focuses primarily on the divorces of older individuals. 
The second limitation is that the ACS only asks respondents the years of their most 
recent marriages. This means that if someone gets a divorce after ten years of marriage 
and then remarries, she will not show up in the data as having been divorced after ten 
years of marriage. Since divorce rates rise after ten-year anniversaries, the estimates 
would be biased towards zero if this happens. Asking about the year of the most 
recent marriage but not the year of divorce also means that I do not know the length 
of marriages for divorced people, which leads to me studying the years since marriages 
began and current marital statuses. Third, Social Security PIA is calculated based on 
lifetime labor earnings, while the ACS only asks about current earnings. Using current 
earnings is especially problematic with older individuals since many are retired. To 
mitigate this concern, I use people’s education levels and the average earnings of 
13I also restrict the sample to only women to avoid counting people from the same marriages 
twice. The results for men are similar to women except that it appears as though there is a slight 
gap at ten-years since marriage for men in the middle age group. This is not entirely surprising given 
the fact that it is likely the age of the woman and not the age of the man that matters since women 
are likely the ones benefit from the ten-year rule. 
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their prior occupations to study what kind of marriages end immediately after ten-
year anniversaries. 
To explore the characteristics of couples who divorce, I create a series of indicator 
variables that capture within-couple specialization that are equal to one if the woman 
is in a certain type of marriage and zero otherwise. Since people who are no longer 
married have a value of zero for these indicator variables, these variables will allow 
for understanding what types of marriages end at ten-year anniversaries. The first 
indicator variable equals one if both members of the couple are in the labor force at 
the time of the interview. I create a separate variable equal to one if an individual 
is married to someone with a different labor force participation status than herself. 
Since current labor force participation is likely a poor proxy for lifetime earnings, I 
also take advantage of the ACS question that asks people if they have ever worked 
over the last five years. I create a variable equal to one if the woman is married to 
someone with the same answer to this question as herself and a separate variable equal 
to one if the woman is married to someone with a different answer to this question. 
If people report that they have worked in the last five years, the ACS asks them 
about their occupation. I compute the mean earnings of each occupation and then 
create a variable equal to one if women are in marriages where one member is in 
an occupation that earns at least 50 percent more on average than the other’s oc-
cupation. I create another variable equal to one if the woman is in a marriage with 
an occupational earnings difference of less than 50 percent. When people have not 
worked during the last five years, they are assigned an occupational earnings of zero 
and are thus identified as being in marriages with wide earnings disparities if their 
spouses worked at all. Finally, I create an indicator variable equal to one if women are 
married to men with the same education levels as well as an indicator equal to one if 
women are married to men with different education levels. Education is an attractive 
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measure because it predicts lifetime earnings and has the advantage of generally being 
fixed from an early age. 
Means of key variables are shown in Table 4. As with the estimates, the means are 
weighted using IPUMS weights. An important difference between older and younger 
women in the sample is how many times they have been married. Only 6 percent 
of younger women have been married more than once, while 83 percent of the older 
sample has had multiple marriages. 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
With the ACS data, I consider what happens to the likelihood of being married 
at ten-year anniversaries by estimating the following equation: 
yi = γst + Xiα + f(li, λ) + Diβ + ηi, (3) 
where i indexes the individual, t indexes the year, s indexes the state, y is either an 
indicator equal to one if the individual is married, X is a set of individual covariates 
that includes years of education, a vector of indicator variables for race, and a vector 
of indicator variables for age, γ is a full set of year and state interactions, f is a smooth 
function representing the profile of the dependent variable with respect to the length 
of marriage l in years, and D is an indicator equal to one if the marriage happened at 
least ten years prior. I model f as a quadratic polynomial on either side of ten-year 
anniversaries. Including state-by-year fixed effects means Equation (3) accounts for 
any state differences and any state-specific shocks over time. For example, state-wide 
law changes regarding the division of assets and changes to a state’s economy are 
both captured by these fixed effects. 
I omit several indicator variables from Equation (3) to avoid multicollinearity. 
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Specifically, I omit the indicator for Alabama in 2008, the indicator for being white, 
and the indicator for the earliest possible age in each regression. The β coefficients 
can be interpreted as the percentage-point change in the likelihood of being married 
at ten years since the beginning of marriages for people who have ever married. 
4.3 Results 
Figure 2 shows how the likelihood of remaining married trends with years since 
marriages began. The likelihood of remaining married trends smoothly at ten-year 
anniversaries for all women except for those who were 45 or older at the time of 
marriage. For women 45 and older at the time of marriage, the likelihood of being 
married gaps down at ten-year anniversaries. 
The results from estimating Equation (3) with indicator variables for remaining 
married as the dependent variable are shown in Table 5. The estimates suggest that 
the likelihood of being married falls by 3.2 percentage points or 3.8 percent as mar-
riages of older women cross the ten-year threshold. This estimate implies that the 
likelihood of being divorced increases by 19.4 percent as marriages of older women 
cross the ten-year mark. Since I classify separated women as being married, the likeli-
hood of being married would trend smoothly at ten-year anniversaries if people were 
moving out before ten-year anniversaries but waiting to file the paperwork. The large 
coefficient indicates that older people are delaying changes in living arrangements as 
well. 
These results are consistent both with couples retiming their divorces and with 
there being extra divorces after ten-year anniversaries for older women. Couples opting 
to forgo divorcing at nine years of marriage would mean the ten-year rule causes the 
likelihood of remaining married at nine years to be artificially high. When these 
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divorce-delaying couples divorce at ten years of marriage, the likelihood of being 
married would gap down even if the ten-year rule only affected marriage timing. On 
the other hand,if there were extra divorces at ten-year anniversaries that did not 
come from couples delaying divorce, the likelihood of remaining married would also 
gap down at ten-year anniversaries. 
Table 6 shows results from using narrower age bins. As in Table 2 with the Vital 
Statistics data, Table 6 indicates non-linearities in response to the ten-year rule based 
on age. The estimated change in the likelihood of remaining married is negative and 
statistically significant for women who married from age 41 to age 55. For women 
who married at younger ages, there is no evidence of changes in the likelihood of 
remaining married at ten-year anniversaries. 
Next I estimate variations of Equation (3) to examine the characteristics of mar-
riages that end at ten years.14 I focus the discussion on older people since they are 
the ones for whom a discontinuity was documented in Table 5. In column one of 
the top panel of Table 7, the dependent variable equals one if the individual is in a 
marriage where both members have the same labor force participation. A negative 
and significant β coefficient would imply that the marriages that end abruptly at ten-
year anniversaries are those where members have the same labor force participation. 
The coefficient on crossing the ten-year mark is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero, suggesting that it is not couples with identical labor force participation statuses 
that drive the fall in marriage probabilities documented in Table 5. In column one 
of the bottom panel of Table 7, the dependent variable equals one if the individual 
is married to someone with a different labor force status than herself. The coefficient 
14I focus on understanding what kind of marriages end at ten years of marriage because I can 
only observe characteristics of both members of the couple when the couple is living together. Once 
a woman is divorced and no longer living with her husband, I can no longer determine characteristics 
of her marriage. 
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of -0.035 suggests that the marriages that end are those where spouses had different 
labor force statuses. 
Column 2 of Table 7 displays β estimates from Equation (3) with the indicator 
variables based on whether or not both members of the couple have ever worked 
over the last five years as the dependent variables. These results indicate that couples 
whose marriages end are those where both members answered the same to having ever 
worked in the last five years. In column 3, the dependent variables are based on average 
earnings of the spouses’ occupations. The coefficient of -0.027 when the dependent 
variable is an indicator for couples having been in occupations with different average 
earnings suggests that it is couples with different earnings potentials who divorce at 
their ten-year anniversaries. 
The last column of Table 7 evaluates how similar the education levels are for 
couples who divorce at ten-year anniversaries. In the last column of the top panel of 
Table 7, the dependent variable is one if women are married to husbands with the 
same education levels. In all cases, the coefficients are statistically insignificant. In 
the bottom panel, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the woman is 
married to someone with a different education level. The estimate of -0.032 for older 
couples indicates that the couples who divorce are those where one member has more 
education than the other member. 
These results are most comparable to Goda et al. (2007), who also study how 
marriage stocks change at ten-year anniversaries and find small, statistically insignifi-
cant differences in divorce probabilities at ten-years of marriage between couples with 
and without large earnings disparities between the primary and secondary earners. 
My estimates of the change in the likelihood of being divorced at ten-year anniver-
saries are small for the full sample as well. Unlike the PSID, though, the ACS allows 
for studying heterogeneity based on age and reveals important differences in age at 
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marriage. 
We would not expect divorces from the ten-year rule to comprise a large share 
of total divorces since the vast majority of marriages are not near their ten-year an-
niversaries and because many factors unrelated to Social Security influence divorce. 
Nevertheless, the ACS allows for performing a back-of-the-envelope calculation to bet-
ter understand the percent of divorces for people who married over the age of 44 that 
are influenced by the ten-year rule. According to the ACS, 98,611 marriages where the 
woman was 45 or older at marriage ended in divorce in 2011. Of these divorces, 9,049 
ended at marriage durations of 10 and 11. The Vital Statistics bunching estimate 
implies that 9.1 percent, or 823, of those divorces in years 10 and 11 are additional 
divorces that would not have occurred in years 10 and 11 without the sudden change 
in spousal benefits after divorce at ten-year anniversaries. These numbers imply that 
the ten-year rule influenced about 0.84 percent of divorces in 2011 for older couples, 
which is a small but non-trivial share of divorces. 
4.4 Heterogeneity, Robustness, and Placebo Tests 
I now test for heterogeneity based on marital status, consider the robustness of 
these results to various estimation choices, and conduct placebo analyses. Table 8 
displays results with the dependent variable being an indicator for being married, 
but the results are similarly robust for other outcome variables. 
I first test for differences between people in their first marriages and people who 
have been married more than once. Heterogeneity by marital history may exist be-
cause people who have been married multiple times may be more aware of divorce 
rules than people who are on their first marriages. Alternatively, people who are on 
subsequent marriages may be eligible for spousal benefits from previous marriages 
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and may therefore not care about reaching the ten-year mark in their current mar-
riages. Column 1 displays results with the sample restricted to people who have only 
married one time, while column 2 displays results with the sample restricted to only 
people who have had multiple marriages. For people married more than once, the 
point estimate of the fall in the likelihood of remaining married at ten years is larger 
in absolute value for the full sample and for people who married at 45 or older. For 
people married only once, the fall in the likelihood of remaining married is statisti-
cally insignificant. These results suggest that older people in subsequent marriages 
may be more responsive to the ten-year rule. 
For the main analysis, I coded an individual as being married if she was separated 
because the SSA uses the official marriage length in determining eligibility for the 
spousal benefit. In column 3, I test the sensitivity of the results to defining being 
married as being zero if people are separated. The results are similar to the original 
estimates. 
All of the ACS estimates are weighted using the IPUMS sample weights. In their 
review of econometric issues associated with survey weights, Solon et al. (2013) sug-
gest considering both weighted and unweighted estimates. Column 4 tests the sensi-
tivity of the estimates to not using weights. The point estimate for the change in the 
likelihood of being married at ten years of marriage for older people is statistically 
indistinguishable from the prior estimate and from zero.15 
Another possible concern is that the controls in Equation (3) may be inadequate, 
15In their analysis of marriage and divorce data, Ratcliffe et al. (2008) evaluate twenty data 
sets containing marital information along a variety of dimensions, including representativeness, and 
conclude that the ACS is one of the three best. Unfortunately, though, no other data set with 
marriage lengths is large enough to verify that the ACS information on years since marriages began 
is nationally representative. Since I use the ACS to verify that the likelihood of being married and 
divorced changes abruptly at ten years of marriage and to study the characteristics of marriages 
that end at ten years, the sample does not need to be representative for the results to be valid. 
Rather, the likelihood of being included in the survey cannot change at ten-years of marriage, which 
it presumably does not. 
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which would be the case if the effects of demographic variables change at the cutoff. 
To consider this possibility, I supplement Equation (3) with interactions of years of 
education, age, and the non-omitted race indicators with quadratic polynomials with 
respect to years since the start of marriages. The results are shown in column 5 and are 
almost identical to the original results, suggesting returns to demographic variables 
changing at the threshold do not drive the fall in the likelihood of remaining married 
at ten-year anniversaries. A related concern is that many factors affect divorce that 
I do not control for, such as health, income, and the presence of children in the 
household. These factors changing discontinuously at ten-year anniversaries could 
potentially bias the results.16 In column 6, I supplement Equation (3) with controls 
for the presence of children, the individual’s annual earnings, and indicator variables 
for having a cognitive difficulty, an ambulatory difficulty, self-care difficulty, vision 
difficulty, or difficulty living alone. The estimates are very similar to the original 
estimates. 
An alternative to estimating Equation (3) using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
would be to estimate the model using a probit regression. Column 7 of Table 8, dis-
plays average marginal effects from probit regressions of Equation (3). The estimates 
of the average change in the likelihood of being married at ten-year anniversaries from 
the probit regressions are nearly identical to the OLS estimates. 
One might also be concerned that f is not flexible enough to capture the likelihood 
of remaining married trending smoothly with years since marriages began for older 
people. In columns 8 and 9, I replicate the analysis using marriage durations of nine 
and eleven years as placebo cutoffs. One of the estimates of abrupt changes in the 
likelihood of being married at these marriage lengths is statistically significant at 
16For these factors to be driving the changes at ten years of marriage, they would have to change 
at ten-year anniversaries other than through divorce. A concern with controlling for these factors is 
that divorce likely affects health, income, and the presence of children. 
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the ten-percent level. An issue with using the years immediately before and after 
the cutoff is that f can be influenced by the cutoff at ten years. As a further check, 
I replicate the analysis setting marriage durations of six through eight and twelve 
through fourteen as the cutoffs. The point estimates are significant at least the ten-
percent level 12.5 percent of the time, which is close to the 10 percent we would 
expect from chance. These results provide evidence that f can sufficiently account for 
the marriage profile trending smoothly. 
Finally, I include widows in the sample and consider how the likelihood that women 
are widows changes at ten-year anniversaries. The likelihood that a woman classifies 
herself as a widow could change at ten-year anniversaries if divorced women are more 
likely to consider themselves widows rather than divorced if their ex-husbands die 
while they are receiving spousal benefits. However, we would be concerned if the 
likelihood of being a widow changes dramatically at ten-year anniversaries. 
Figure 3 shows how the likelihood of being a widow changes with years since 
marriages began. Estimates of Equation (3) with the dependent variable being an 
indicator equal to one if the woman is a widow are shown in Table 9. The profiles 
with respect to years since marriage do not provide evidence of large spikes at ten-
year anniversaries. The change in the likelihood of being a widow is estimated to 
increase by 0.3 percentage points and is significant at the five percent level. None 
of the estimated discontinuities are statistically significant for any of the age groups. 
Although statistically significant for the full sample, the estimate is 91 percent smaller 
than the estimate for the decrease in the likelihood of remaining married after ten 




Social Security is a key part of retirement plans and retirement income for Ameri-
cans. This paper provides evidence that Social Security’s requirement that spouses be 
married for at least ten years before qualifying for spousal benefits influences divorce 
timing and propensities. Around 2 percent of divorces occurring within the six months 
after ten-year anniversaries would have occurred before them if not for Social Secu-
rity’s ten-year rule. For older couples, the effects are even more dramatic. It appears 
that many older couples would not have divorced if they could not receive spousal 
benefits after divorce or that they delay divorce for many years to benefit from the 
ten-year rule. Even many middle aged couples, who account for over forty percent of 
all divorces in the sample, delay divorcing until after their ten-year anniversaries. 
The likelihood of being divorced gaps up at ten-year anniversaries for women 45 
or older at the time of marriage, suggesting Social Security’s ten-year rule is not 
only affecting the timing of divorce paperwork. Instead, people delay changing living 
arrangements until after ten years of marriage. The marriages that end are ones where 
one member of the couple likely earned significantly more than the other, which speaks 
to the importance of the spousal benefit for women who specialize in home production. 
As the ten-year rule means that many secondary earners are better off from divorcing 
after ten-year anniversaries relative to divorcing before ten-year anniversaries, the 
results from this paper provide evidence that financial well-being after divorce is a 
consideration for people when making the decision to leave a marriage. 
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Table 1: Discontinuity in Divorces at Ten Years of Marriage 
Discontinuity at 10 Years 
Divorces at Number Log of Number 
9 Years of Divorces of Divorces 
All Couples 73,575 166*** 0.033*** 
(56) (0.009) 
Married Younger than 25 46,188 60 0.020* 
(44) (0.011) 
Married from 25 to 44 25,775 79*** 0.043*** 
(30) (0.014) 
Married Older than 44 1,612 27*** 0.230*** 
(8) (0.064) 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. The data are from 
the 1985 to 1995 Vital Statistics data on divorces and include all divorces 
that occurred within four years of ten-year anniversaries. All regressions 
control for quadratics in length of marriage in months on either side of 
ten-year anniversaries of marriages. The discontinuity in divorces at ten 
years is per month. 
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Table 2: Discontinuity in Divorces at Ten Years of Marriage— 
Narrower Age Bins 
Discontinuity at 10 Years 
Divorces at Number Log of Number 
9 Years of Divorces of Divorces 
Married from 16 to 20 24,780 30 0.021 
(27) (0.013) 
Married from 21 to 25 24,094 41 0.022 
(32) (0.016) 
Married from 26 to 30 12,335 46** 0.047** 
(19) (0.018) 
Married from 31 to 35 5,895 17 0.048 
(13) (0.030) 
Married from 36 to 40 2,823 11 0.068 
(11) (0.046) 
Married from 41 to 45 1,334 -2 0.011 
(7) (0.069) 
Married from 46 to 50 704 12** 0.232** 
(5) (0.096) 
Married from 51 to 55 345 67** 0.263** 
(3) (0.122) 
Married from 56 to 60 157 8*** 0.613*** 
(2) (0.168) 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. The data are 
from the 1985 to 1995 Vital Statistics data on divorces and include all 
divorces that occurred within four years of ten-year anniversaries. All 
regressions control for quadratics in length of marriage in months on 
either side of ten-year anniversaries of marriages. The discontinuity in 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Means of Key Variables from the America Community Survey 
Within 5 to 14 9 Years 10 Years 
Years of Marriage since Marriage since Marriage 
Full Sample 
Married 0.830 0.829 0.816 
Divorced 0.170 0.171 0.184 
Black 0.100 0.101 0.104 
White 0.763 0.763 0.761 
Hispanic 0.160 0.159 0.162 
Age 39.675 39.377 40.275 
College 0.325 0.327 0.319 
High School 0.908 0.907 0.902 
Married More than Once 0.312 0.316 0.315 
Married to Spouse with Same LFP 0.505 0.499 0.494 
Married to Spouse with Diff LFP 0.229 0.235 0.229 
Married to Spouse with Same LFP over Last 5 Years 0.597 0.592 0.577 
Married to Spouse with Diff LFP over Last 5 Years 0.137 0.141 0.145 
Married to Spouse in Occ with Similar Wages 0.340 0.337 0.327 
Married to Spouse in Occ with Different Wages 0.490 0.492 0.489 
Married to Spouse with Same Education Level 0.289 0.287 0.286 
Married to Spouse with Diff Education Levels 0.541 0.542 0.530 
n 809,912 82,283 84,612 
Married before Age 25 
Married 0.828 0.825 0.820 
Divorced 0.172 0.175 0.180 
Black 0.075 0.074 0.077 
White 0.769 0.769 0.768 
Hispanic 0.218 0.219 0.225 
Age 30.613 30.129 31.066 
College 0.272 0.276 0.270 
High School 0.887 0.883 0.877 
Married More than Once 0.060 0.056 0.057 
Married to Spouse with Same LFP 0.464 0.451 0.458 
Married to Spouse with Diff LFP 0.257 0.268 0.260 
Married to Spouse with Same LFP over Last 5 Years 0.577 0.572 0.563 
Married to Spouse with Diff LFP over Last 5 Years 0.144 0.146 0.155 
Married to Spouse in Occ with Similar Wages 0.344 0.343 0.333 
Married to Spouse in Occ with Different Wages 0.484 0.482 0.487 
Married to Spouse with Same Education Level 0.292 0.291 0.291 
Married to Spouse with Diff Education Levels 0.535 0.534 0.529 
n 258,285 26,309 26,754 
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Continued from previous page 
Within 5 to 14 9 Years 10 Years 
Years of Marriage since Marriage since Marriage 
Married from 25 to 44 
Married 0.830 0.830 0.816 
Divorced 0.170 0.170 0.184 
Black 0.114 0.116 0.119 
White 0.749 0.747 0.747 
Hispanic 0.139 0.138 0.137 
Age 41.233 40.934 41.881 
College 0.374 0.376 0.363 
High School 0.924 0.925 0.921 
Married More than Once 0.370 0.378 0.378 
Married to Spouse with Same LFP 0.529 0.526 0.516 
Married to Spouse with Diff LFP 0.210 0.211 0.208 
Married to Spouse with Same LFP over Last 5 Years 0.617 0.610 0.594 
Married to Spouse with Diff LFP over Last 5 Years 0.122 0.127 0.130 
Married to Spouse in Occ with Similar Wages 0.352 0.348 0.340 
Married to Spouse in Occ with Different Wages 0.478 0.482 0.476 
Married to Spouse with Same Education Level 0.290 0.288 0.286 
Married to Spouse with Diff Education Levels 0.541 0.543 0.530 
n 453,586 45,894 47,635 
Married Older than 44 
Married 0.835 0.836 0.805 
Divorced 0.165 0.164 0.195 
Black 0.106 0.107 0.111 
White 0.819 0.827 0.817 
Hispanic 0.085 0.077 0.089 
Age 61.063 61.202 61.855 
College 0.235 0.233 0.232 
High School 0.890 0.889 0.879 
Married More than Once 0.825 0.826 0.825 
Married to Spouse with Same LFP 0.507 0.504 0.487 
Married to Spouse with Diff LFP 0.242 0.251 0.240 
Married to Spouse with Same LFP over Last 5 Years 0.556 0.562 0.528 
Married to Spouse with Diff LFP over Last 5 Years 0.194 0.193 0.199 
Married to Spouse in Occ with Similar Wages 0.258 0.255 0.237 
Married to Spouse in Occ with Different Wages 0.577 0.581 0.569 
Married to Spouse with Same Education Level 0.274 0.270 0.267 
Married to Spouse with Diff Education Levels 0.561 0.566 0.538 
n 98,041 10,080 10,223 
The sample is from the 2008 to 2011 IPUMS ACS and consists of women whose most recent marriages began 
between 5 and 14 years prior to the survey year. All means are computed using IPUMS weights. 
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Table 5: Changes in the Likelihood of Remaining Mar-
ried at 10 Years since Marriage 
Indicator Variable 
n for Being Married 
Full Sample 809,912 -0.006 
(0.004) 
Married Younger than 25 258,285 -0.000 
(0.007) 
Married from 25 to 44 453,586 -0.003 
(0.005) 
Married Older than 44 98,041 -0.032*** 
(0.011) 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%. The sample is from the 2008 to 2011 IPUMS ACS and 
consists of women whose most recent marriages began be-
tween 5 and 14 years prior to the survey year. Robust stan-
dard errors are shown in parentheses. All regressions use 
IPUMS weights and control for age, education, race, sex, 
year and state interactions, and a quadratic with respect 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Changes in the Likelihood of Being Widowed at 10 Years since Marriage 
Probability of Being Widowed Indicator Variable 
n at 9 Years of Marriage for Being Widowed 
Full Sample 832,586 0.026 0.003** 
(0.001) 
Married Younger than 25 260,135 0.008 0.001 
(0.002) 
Married from 25 to 44 461,304 0.018 0.003 
(0.002) 
Married Older than 44 111,147 0.121 0.013 
(0.008) 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The sample is from the 2008 
to 2011 IPUMS ACS and consists of women whose most recent marriages began between 
5 and 14 years prior to the survey year. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
All regressions use IPUMS weights and control for age, education, race, sex, year and state 
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Figure 2: Probability of Remaining Married by Years since the Marriage Began, from 
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Figure 3: Probability of Being Widowed by Years since the Marriage Began, from the 
2008 to 2011 ACS 
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Appendices 
A Trend Breaks before the Ten-Year Rule 
To test for similar discontinuities at ten years of marriage before the ten-year rule 
was implemented, I use data from 1966 to 1974. The reason for allowing several years 
of data before the passage of the 1977 law is that the law applied to all existing 
divorces, not just the ones happening after the law was passed. This means divorce 
rates might change before the law if people were anticipating the change from a 
twenty-year to a ten-year requirement. 
I first conduct Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to determine whether or not the distri-
butions of marriage lengths are different for the two time periods. A failure to reject 
that they are different would cast doubt on the ten-year rule being responsible for the 
discontinuity observed at ten years of marriage presented in the main text. Both for 
the full sample and for each age group, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject the null 
hypotheses that the distributions are the same at the one-percent level. These tests 
provide suggestive evidence that the ten-year rule influences divorce timing. 
As divorce norms and economic factors changed between these two time periods, 
it is possible that the distributions could be different even without the ten-year rule 
being implemented. As such, I next replicate the approach taken in the main analysis 
to test for discontinuities at ten years of marriage before the ten-year rule was imple-
mented. Graphs of the divorce profiles before the ten-year rule was implemented are 
shown in Figure A.1. As with the main Vital Statistics results, the number of divorces 
falls with the duration of marriages. In none of the graphs does there appear to be any 
gaps or bunching associated with ten years of marriage. Table A.1 shows estimates 
of the discontinuities at ten-year anniversaries using data from 1966 to 1974. All of 
the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero and provide no evidence of 
44 
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Figure A.1: Divorces by Marriage Length, from the 1966 to 1974 Vital Statistics Data 
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Table A.1: Discontinuity in Divorces at Ten Years of Marriage before 
Ten-Year Rule 
Divorces at Number Log of Number 
9 Years of Divorces of Divorces 
All Couples 17,950 -14 -0.004 
(23) (0.016) 
Married Younger than 25 10,726 3 0.011 
(19) (0.021) 
Married from 25 to 44 6,395 -15 -0.028 
(13) (0.025) 
Married Older than 44 829 -2 -0.020 
(5) (0.080) 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. The data are from 
the 1966 to 1974 Vital Statistics data on divorces and include all divorces 
that occurred within four years of ten-year anniversaries. All regressions 
control for quadratics in length of marriage in months on either side of 
ten-year anniversaries of marriages. The discontinuity in divorces at ten 
years is per month. 
47 
B Sensitivity of Bunching Estimates to Polynomial 
The bunching results presented in Section 3 modeled g as a cubic polynomial in 
Equation (2). Tables B.1 through B.4 show the sensitivity of the bunching results 
to using polynomials of different degrees. The results using bunching regions of six 
months, one year, or one-and-half years are very similar regardless of the polynomial 
used. When the bunching region is two years wide, the estimate of extra divorces 
after ten-year anniversaries for older couples is not significant for higher polynomials. 
However, the estimates are similar in size and do not provide evidence that contradicts 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C Discontinuities in Divorces at Prior Cutoff 
I now test for evidence of a discontinuity at twenty-year anniversaries using data 
from 1966 to 1974, which is when the SSA required twenty years of marriage before di-
vorced spouses were eligible for spousal benefits. Because few people marry older than 
44 and divorce around twentieth anniversaries and because the people who marry at 
25 or older are in their mid-forties or older at their twenty-year anniversaries, I divide 
couples into two age groups instead of three. Figure C.1 shows how divorces trend 
with marriage duration near twenty-year anniversaries. It appears as though divorces 
may increase abruptly after twenty-year anniversaries for couples who married older 
than 24 but not dramatically so. 
I next estimate Equation (2) setting twenty years as the cutoff and using data from 
1966 to 1974 on divorces that occurred within four years of twentieth anniversaries. 
The results are shown below in Table C.1. Although I cannot rule out a large dis-
continuity for older couples, neither the graphs nor the estimates provide compelling 
evidence of a discontinuity in divorces at twenty years of marriage. This ambiguous 
evidence contrasts with the strong evidence of bunching around ten-year anniver-
saries. These results may suggest that people who have been married twenty years 
are less sensitive to Social Security incentives than people who have been married 
for ten years. Alternatively, they may also indicate that the passage of the ten-year 
rule raised awareness that Social Security provided spousal benefits to marriages that 
lasted certain lengths before divorce. 
53 
Table C.1: Discontinuity in Divorces at Twenty Years of Marriage 
Prior to Ten-Year Rule 





Log of Number 
of Divorces 
All Couples 
Married Younger than 25 















Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. The data are from 
the 1966 to 1974 Vital Statistics data on divorces and include all divorces 
that occurred within four years of ten-year anniversaries. All regressions 
control for quadratics in length of marriage in months on either side of 
ten-year anniversaries of marriages. The discontinuity in divorces at ten 
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Figure C.1: Divorces by Marriage Length, from the 1966 to 1974 Vital Statistics Data 
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